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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) may interact and manipulate objects in the
physical world with the aid of communication channels. Additionally, due
to their nature, most CPS are safety-critical systems where there are safety
invariant that need to be preserved. The big challenge is that communication
channels are unreliable meaning that there may not be bounds on message
delays. this will pose a threat to the safety of system. Guaranteeing safety
for these systems can be even further complicated as physical components
with which these systems interact may not have accurate physical models
available.
In this Thesis we discuss two approaches to solve the safety problem. In the
first part, we discuss a general methodology and architecture for distributed
CPS design in order to increase the resiliency to communication faults. In this
approach, each node exploits physical connections between nodes to estimate
some of the state parameters of the remote nodes in order to detect the
faults and also to maintain stability of system after fault occurrence. Finally,
as a case study, a fault-resilient decentralized voltage control algorithm is
presented and evaluated.
In the second part of the thesis, we address the challenge of proving safety
and progress in distributed CPS communicating over an unreliable commu-
nication layer. This is done in two parts. First, we show that system safety
can be verified by partially relying upon run-time checks, and that dropping
messages if the run-time checks fail will maintain safety. Second, we use a
notion of compatible action chains to guarantee system progress, despite un-
bounded message delays. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
on a multi-agent vehicle flocking system, and show that the overhead of the
proposed run-time checks is not overbearing.
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CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY AND INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems are a class of systems in which physical systems are
in tight combination with computation elements and they feature a high
level of coordination with each other. Distributed cyber-physical systems,
as an important subgroup of cyber-physical systems, can be defined as a set
of interconnected computer controlled physical plants that physically affect
each other. Which means, output of each distributed node is not only a
function of its own control inputs and state variables, but also is a function
of state in other nodes of the system depending on connection graph and
physical structure. Examples of these types of systems include power grids,
water and waste-water distribution system, and traffic control system. High
criticality of this class of systems is the main reason that maintaining safety
and stability is the first priority for every system architect. Any accidental
or malicious fault in any of the above components can lead to huge costs and
irreparable damages.
One of the biggest challenges in the guaranteeing safety of distributed
CPS is the communication channel. Real-worlds communication channels
are unreliable meaning that packets are not guaranteed to be delivered. A
packet in a channel, can get delayed for unbounded amount of time, can
get dropped in the routers or can get reordered relative to other packets.
In addition, lots of software written for these systems assume the minimum
reliability level provided by TCP/IP protocols. However, physical failures
can violate TCP/IP guarantees, therefore, any control protocols for CPS
must be tolerant to any type of communication failures.
An example of a distributed CPS is autonomous coordinated vehicle mo-
tion. A set of vehicles is moving through a shared physical space, and the user
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would like to be able to make run-time changes to the routes of the vehicles,
while guaranteeing that a formation is maintained and vehicles will not col-
lide. Since messages may be lost over wireless, any new route command may
arrive at some vehicles but not at others. Acknowledgments will not solve
this problem, since acknowledgments may also sometimes be lost. Clearly,
without appropriate solutions, using current communication channels would
not be able to guarantee the safety predicate in this system.
Electric grid is another well-known distributed CPS that has two general
control architectures; centralized and decentralized. In centralized methods,
all the nodes of the system are connected through communication channels
to a central supervisory control and data acquisition center. In decentral-
ized algorithms, each node only communicates with only a subset of nodes
without any central controller. In [1], based on examination of 162 distur-
bances reported by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
authors indicate that, ”information system failures contribute to a very high
percentage of large failures”. In both cases, the communication channels play
an essential role and failures, faults or latency in them can endanger system
safety.
As in distributed systems with lossy communication, it is impossible to
achieve consensus in this system [2]. Despite this inherent limitation, we
propose two approached to ensure the safety of the system. In the first ap-
proach which is described in chapter 2, we propose using physical signals as
an alternative to the communication channels during communication faults.
Our proposed architecture enables each node to independently manage its
states such that the whole system remains stable until the communication
resumes. After description of the general architecture, we investigate a dis-
tributed voltage control approach for power grid as a case study. We apply
our architecture to this system, and show how voltage can remain in the
safe range while some channels are lost. This approach is considered as most
useful for highly interconnected CPS that do not have open loop stability.
In the second chapter if this thesis, we have introduced a communica-
tion/control protocol which can guarantee safety of the system and provide
progress under certain conditions. In this chapter We consider a CPS sce-
nario consisting of several embedded computing components each interacting
and sensing the physical world and communicating with a central coordinator
over an unreliable channel, such as wireless or the Internet. These low-level
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controllers attempt to accomplish some task in a coordinated fashion. Since
the physical world is being manipulated, it is essential that the supervisory
control logic is carefully designed and satisfies strict safety requirements.
This solution is designed for centralized systems where there is a central con-
troller who issues command for the rest of the agents. By using the proposed
approach we can ensure the safety invariant. If the communication channel
eventually delivers packets, we can also provide the notion of progress that
enables the system to safely change the commands at run-time.
Finally, in the last chapter we provide a look into the future directions and
challenges that are still remaining.
1.2 References and Acknowledgments
The material presented in this work is based upon work supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) under grant numbers CNS-1302563, CNS-
1219064 and CNS-1035736, and by John Deere under Award No. UIUC-CS-
DEERE RPS #19. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommen-
dations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the NSF or John Deere.
Some of the material here has previously appeared in proceedings [3, 4] and
is copyrighted by the Institute of the Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE). Portions of this thesis, with permission, are reprinted from:
• ”Using Run-Time Checking to Provide Safety and Progress for Dis-
tributed Cyber-Physical Systems”, S. Bak, F. Abdi taghi abad, Z.
Huang, M. Caccamo, Proceedings of the IEEE conference on Embed-
ded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications (RTCSA’13),
Taipei, Taiwan, August 2013.
• ”A Fault Resilient Architecture for Distributed Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems”, F. Abdi Taghi Abad, B. Robbins, and M. Caccamo, Proceed-
ings of the IEEE conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing
Systems and Applications (RTCSA’12), Seoul, Korea, August 2012.
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1.3 Related Work
Networked control systems have been employed in a variety of industrial
automation applications. Recently, industrial wireless protocols and products
have been developed as replacements for wired control systems [5, 6]. These
were made not only to reduce costs due to materials (wiring), installation
and wire maintenance, but also provide benefits in flexibility by allowing
easy modification to the existing communication infrastructure. One benefit
of using these solutions is that they strive to reduce (but can not eliminate)
problems arising from communication delay and packetloss when wireless is
used in industrial control systems.
The Simplex Architecture [7] was developed as an approach to increase
system safety for individual Linear Time Invariant (LTI) control systems, by
filtering commands from an untrusted controller and switching over to a safe
backup mode. This approach can compliment the one presented in this work,
by providing safety in the low-level controllers in a CPS architecture [8].
A network extension of Simplex has also recently been developed [9]. This
work extended the Simplex approach to Linear Parameter Varying (LPV)
systems, and incorporated network delays into the design. However, the
analysis requires having a fixed upper bound on communication delay with
no packetloss, which can not be guaranteed under wireless communication.
Our guarantees of safety and progress hold without a fixed upper bound
on communication delay, and, in the case of safety, we allow unrestricted
packetloss to occur.
Our approach draws inspiration from the NASS framework developed to
provide safety for medical systems communicating over wireless [10]. This
system uses discrete dynamics with formal safety properties in a supervisory
control system over wireless. Each command message includes a backup
command vector, which is used if no further commands arrive. A safety
filter provides protection from faults in the high-level control. This filter
needs to reason about the worst-case packet delivery combinations, which
in the case of the considered discrete system involves model-checking the
possible combinations of packet reception and agent states. In our approach,
we use a more control-oriented approach to providing safety and progress
which allows for continuous state variables, and provide a method to help
construct pair-wise compatible chains to guarantee progress.
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Run-time approaches have been considered to create verified systems [11].
In this work, a time-bounded reachability computation is performed during
system operation in order to determine if a controller should be disengaged.
The advantage of this is approach is, since at runtime some of the variables
are known, only a smaller state space needs to be considered. This is also the
argument we make when advocating the design of the Runtime Command
Monitor.
For partially synchronous systems, where messages get bounded nondeter-
ministic delays or dropped, a sufficient condition for verifying convergence
properties has been established [12]. The sufficient conditions require that
(i) messages get delivered infinitely often and (ii) there exist some invariant
neighborhood topology of the system satisfying a Lyapunov-type property.
For asynchronous distributed systems, where messages get nondeterminis-
tic but bounded delay, a static approach for reasoning about the convergence
of an asynchronous system has been proposed [13]. The approach shows that
under under some additional assumptions about the shape of the sublevel
sets of the Lyapunov function, if convergence occurs in perfect communica-
tion, where messages get delivered instantly without dropping, convergence
will also occur in the the corresponding synchronous system.
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CHAPTER 2
A FAULT RESILIENT ARCHITECTURE
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in the introduction section, communication channels are one
of the most critical components of the distributed cyber-physical systems.
There has been efforts on the communication community to provide more
robust and secure communication for specific CPS applications [14]. In [15],
ubiquitous TCP/IP protocols were deployed to provide reliable data deliv-
ery for a cyber-physical system. These protocols have unpredictable latency
which can cause major problems for time-critical control decisions [16, 17].
While most of these efforts in communication networks have focused on pre-
vention, there is not much work for system control methods under malicious
or accidental fault situations [18]. In case of any data streaming disconnec-
tion or delayed packet arrival, controllers would have to make decisions based
only on their local state and unaware of rest of the system. This will highly
increase the chance of taking system into a non-safe state.
Another issue with power grid infrastructure is that the technology cur-
rently being deployed by power grid communication infrastructure belongs
to few decades ago during which many of the current advances in the dis-
tributed computing was not even made. Due to under-investment and heavy
cost for transitioning to new communication solutions, deployment of new
technologies in this infrastructure will not happen in a close future [19, 20].
Thus, a solution that can help overcome this problem without huge changes
to the existing infrastructure is highly valuable. In this chapter, we are trying
to exploit some unique features of cyber-physical systems and propose an
architecture for this purpose.
We noticed that most of the previous works have not considered the dy-
namics of physical systems and how they can be used to detect compromised
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nodes or a fault in a component [18]. We are exploiting physical connections
between different nodes in order to enable each node to estimate state of the
other nodes. Our architecture can be implemented with existing communi-
cation infrastructure and is resilient to the faults that might occur in the
communication channels.
In section 2.2, first two unique features of cyber-physical systems are dis-
cussed. Based on this discussion, the general fault resilient architecture and
design approach is described. In section 2.3, following this architecture, a
fault resilient decentralized voltage control algorithm is suggested. In section
2.4, the effect of faults on unmodified decentralized voltage control algorithm
and fault resilient decentralized voltage control algorithm is compared using
two different communication fault scenarios.
2.2 Fault Resilient Controller Architecture
In this section, we first give a brief explanation about structure of physical
connections and communication links between the nodes of distributed cyber-
physical system followed by a discussion on the features of cyber-physical
systems that we want to exploit for our architecture. The last part describes
the architecture of a fault resilient controller.
2.2.1 Preliminary
The communications network and physical network initially share the same
graph, i.e., their lines share the same transmission line. However, the struc-
ture of the graph can change due to failures or different operating modes.
The physical system can be represented by a graph Gp = {V,Ep}, where
V = {1, 2, ...,m} is the set of nodes and the edge set Ep ⊆ V × V represents
the physical interconnections between each pair of nodes. By convention, we
assume the graph is undirected, i.e., if (i, j) ∈ Ep, then (j, i) ∈ Ep. Npi is the
set of physical neighbors of node i. Gp is considered to be strongly connected
when there is a path of finite size from node i to node j for all i, j ∈ V .
Similarly, we define the graph Gc = {V,Ec} that shares the same vertex
and edges set as Gp to represent the communication network. We define N ci
as the set of cyber neighbors of node i which can exchange data with node
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i. Node j is said to be a disconnected neighbor of node i if (i, j) ∈ Ep but
(i, j) /∈ Ec, i.e., node i and j are physical neighbors but the communication
channel connecting them is not available. Di represents set of disconnected
neighbors of node i. Since physical faults are outside the scope of this work,
we assume that Ep and Npi remain constant. However, E
c and N ci change
when a fault occurs on a communication channel.
Each node can be classified as one of the following categories:
• Connected Nodes: Nodes that have an empty Di set which means,
‖Di‖ = 0. Initially, all the nodes are categorized under this category.
• Partially Connected Nodes: Nodes that have at least one connected
neighbor and one disconnected neighbor which means, ‖Di‖ ≥ 1 and
‖N ci ‖ ≥ 1.
• Totally Disconnected Nodes: are the nodes that have an empty set of
neighbors which means, ‖N ci ‖ = 0.
Since system has a connected graph, there is no node with ‖N ci ‖ = 0 and
‖Di‖ = 0.
2.2.2 Features of Cyber-Physical Systems
While cyber-physical systems share many similarities with other computa-
tional systems such as data networks, cloud servers, and real-time systems,
cyber-physical systems have some unique features among them. First, some
of issued cyber messages are directly or indirectly related to a physical state.
Second, the nodes in a distributed cyber-physical system are physically con-
nected to one another, which enables them to estimate certain states of rest
of the system.
Cyber messages are classified as either command or report messages. Com-
mand messages are sent to invoke specified physical changes for certain nodes
in the system and the changes will be observed in the next cycle. Report
messages are sent to check the current physical state of the system. For ex-
ample, when a central controller in a water distribution system issues a stop
command for a particular tap, the water flow in the pipe must drop down to
zero after that point. If water is observed to be flowing, then this would be
considered a fault in either message passing channels, controller in charge of
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receiving and interpreting the command, or the physical plant in charge of
performing command, i.e. mechanical tap. In this situation, a report com-
mand occurs when the message indicating amount of water flow being sent
from one neighbor to another one does not match with the measured water
flow. This can indicate a communication failure, reporter failure (failure in
sensors or controller of reporter), or a physical failure such as water pipe
leakage.
The physical connections between nodes enable them to potentially esti-
mate certain state parameters of their neighbors within a specified tolerance
based on local measurements. In these systems, nodes can use a combination
of local measurements and estimated state variables to supplement the data
received over communication channels. Relating back to the water distribu-
tion system example, based on measurement of flow that enters one node of
the system which is a locally measurable parameter for each node, and also
some prior information about physical structure of pipes one node can have
an estimation of water pressure in its immediate physical neighbors.
As a result of these characteristics, our proposed architecture exploits the
estimated states of remote nodes to detect communication faults and main-
tain the overall stability of the controlled cyber-physical system. The pro-
posed architecture is described in the next subsection.
2.2.3 Architecture Description
Fig. 2.1 shows the various layers of our architecture and illustrates the com-
munications between them. In the rest of this subsection, the descriptions of
each component and design approach is provided.
Estimation Unit
A system designer needs to have a deep understanding of the physical struc-
ture of the system in order to extract all the relations between physical
variables of distributed nodes. In addition, designer needs to analyze avail-
able locally measurable variables. Physical connections can provide a set of
linear or non-linear equations, inequalities, or logical relations between state
variables of different nodes. These relations can be utilized by a node when
reliable data is not received in order to estimate state variables of remote
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Figure 2.1: Fault Resilient Controller Architecture
nodes. Considering all estimation methods, physical connections, and local
measurements designer can detect all the remote state variables that can be
estimated by each node. Simply by reading data directly provided by lo-
cal sensors, estimation unit estimates some of the state variables of remote
nodes.
Accuracy of the estimations depends on the physical connections, accuracy
of sensors and accuracy of estimation equations. Maximum error of estima-
tion for remote variable X, which can be determined through experiment, is
called emaxx .
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Communication Unit
At each control cycle, communication unit transmits two set of information
to the neighbor nodes in following form.
TransmitPacket = {Packetdist ∪ Packetmeas}
Packetdist is the set of data that is required for distributed controller repre-
sented. Transmitting Packetdist is the purpose of communication. Basically
all the communication channels are established in order to transmit this set.
Packetmeas represents the measured local variables that are estimable for
the neighbor nodes and is being transmitted in order to be used by the other
neighbors to verify if the communication channel is working properly. Simply,
if the communication unit and communication channel work properly, the
estimated value and received amount would match.
In addition, communication unit has a buffer associated with each neighbor
which is updated whenever a new value is received from that neighbor.
Switching Module
Switching module is in charge of detecting communication failures and switch-
ing to the appropriate controller depending on the situation of node.
When a new message is received from remote nodes by communication
unit, it overwrite the previous message in the buffer. Switching module
periodically reads the buffer and checks if the following inequality holds or
not.
|xdata − xest| ≤ emaxx (2.1)
In the above inequality, xdata is read from communication unit buffer which
is reported by the remote node through communication channel, xest is the
estimated value of x and emaxx is the maximum estimation error for variable
x.
Inequality (2.1) checks whether the estimated value and received value
match with each other and it must hold for a correctly received remote state
variable. In case of not receiving a new value or receiving a corrupted value,
the inequality will be violated and a communication fault is detected.
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Once a failure is detected for the communication channel of the neighbor
bj ∈ Ni, bj is removed from set of cyber neighbors of bi, N ci and is added to
set of disconnected nodes of bi, Di. After this point, bi does not send local
measurements to bj in order to make it add bi into its disconnected nodes
set, Dj.
Switching module keeps track of N ci and Di and determines the category
to which the node belongs based on number of members of ‖N ci ‖ and ‖Di‖.
Every time that a new fault is detected, it triggers a switch to hybrid con-
troller if node is categorized as a partially disconnected node and it triggers
a switch to the local controller if the node is categorized as a totally discon-
nected node.
Notice that a switch is triggered only when a fault is detected in at least
one of the communication channels. Thus this node cannot be categorized
as a connected node anymore.
Distributed Controller
This controller is designed for the normal operation mode when communica-
tion is properly working and reliable data is received from all the neighbors.
For most of the existing distributed cyber-physical systems, their existing
controller can be used in this part of fault-resilient architecture without any
modification.
Hybrid Controller
Node bi is controlled by this controller if ‖Di‖ ≥ 1 and ‖N ci ‖ ≥ 1, i.e. it
has both disconnected and connected neighbors. Hence, hybrid controller
has access to both communication unit in order to receive information of the
connected nodes and also has access to the estimation unit outputs for its
disconnected nodes.
In design of this controller, the algorithm implemented in the distributed
controller should be modified in the way that the estimated data replace the
received data.
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Local Controller
The reason this controller is called a local controller is that it does not require
network communication. This controller is activated when N ci = 0. Control
algorithm implemented in this controller can only exploit a combination of
estimated state variables of remote nodes and locally measured variables.
The main goal of this controller is to prevent the node and immediate neigh-
bors from instability. Since some of the state variables of remote nodes might
be non-estimable , or due to estimation errors, the outcome of this controller
may not lead to optimal solution.
2.2.4 Notes
In this work we assume that probability of controller and sensor faults is neg-
ligible compared to communication faults. However, there are classic fault
tolerant solutions such as system redundancy that can make these compo-
nents more reliable. Another well-known technique for increasing reliability
of controller is simplex architecture as explained in [21], [22], [23], and [24].
2.3 Fault Resilient Decentralized Voltage Control
Algorithm
In this section we apply proposed fault resilient architecture to an electric
power grid which follows a decentralized voltage control algorithm. Our goal
is to detect occurrence of communication faults, and then maintain voltages
in the permitted range of V nominal ± 0.05V nominal.
First, physical and communication structure model for the power system
is described. Then a brief introduction to the decentralized voltage con-
trol algorithm (DVC) is presented followed by a detailed description of fault
resilient architecture and local controller algorithm. Finally, two commu-
nication fault scenarios are presented and results of fault resilient versus
unmodified original algorithm are compared with each other.
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2.3.1 Power System Model
Power systems are analyzed and assumed to be in quasi steady-state at 60 hz
for power flow calculations and dispatch commands [25]. Given a n + 1 bus
power distribution system, we fix the voltage at the reference bus, otherwise
known as the slack bus, and consider the remaining n buses to be PQ buses.
On each PQ bus i, the active power Pi and the reactive power Qi are fixed.
Then the voltage magnitude Vi and voltage angle θi are computed by solving
for the roots of mismatch equations, which are the difference of the specified
power with the computed powers P (V, θ) and Q(V, θ). We use the power flow
equations to compute the sensitivities of bus powers to changes in voltage[
∆P
∆Q
]
=
[
∂P/∂θ ∂P/∂V
∂Q/∂θ ∂Q/∂V
][
∆θ
∆V
]
. (2.2)
However, the weak coupling between ∆P and ∆V , as well as ∆Q and ∆θ,
enables (2.2) to be reduced to
∆P = [∂P/∂θ] ∆θ (2.3)
∆Q = [∂Q/∂V ] ∆V. (2.4)
This is a common simplification that is used in the fast decouple power flow
method [25]. Finally, we can estimate the voltage sensitivity to changes
in reactive power by S = [∂Q/∂V ]−1. Voltage sensitivity of each node to
the non-neighbor nodes’ reactive power is assumed to be zero therefore S is
produced based on S with non-zero entities only for neighbor nodes.
The physical and communication networks can be represented by the graphs
Gp and Gc, respectively. The system has a total of m ≤ n buses (nodes) with
distributed energy resources (DERs) attached that are able to provide some
amount of reactive power support pii, which is limited by a maximum capac-
ity pimaxi > 0 and a minimum capacity to pi
min
i < 0. In this model, the active
power provided by DERs is not controlled. Note that for the remainder of
the chapter, each electric node i will be represented by bi.
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2.3.2 Decentralized Voltage Control Algorithm (DVC)
The control architecture shown in Fig. 2.1 is applied to improve the reliability
of an existing decentralized voltage control (DVC) algorithm published in
[26]. We will provide a brief overview of the algorithm, while the reader can
refer to [26] for a more detailed explanation and discussion.
The purpose of this algorithm is to maintain system voltages within the
specified range Vnominal ± 0.05Vnominal. According to DVC, bus voltages are
measured at steps r = {1, 2, . . . } and the distributed algorithm is given k
steps between r and r + 1 to reach a solution. We begin the algorithm by
estimating the amount of reactive power that if injected (or absorbed) at
bi, will correct the measured voltage limit violation at that bus, i.e., the
controllers estimate this value with (2.9). After the initialization procedure,
the controllers run a recursive algorithm in which their current value is a
linear combination of their previous and that of their neighbors until the
system converges. The algorithm has the form
pii[k + 1] = pii[k]pii[k] +
∑
j∈Nci
pij[k]pij[k], (2.5)
where pij[k] ∈ [0, 1] for all i and j ∈ {N ci ∪ i}. P [0] is constructed based on:
pij[0] =
sij∑n
k=1 skj
(2.6)
where n is the number of all the nodes in the system.
The DVC relies on the construction of a column stochastic matrix that
must be primitive, i.e., a nonnegative matrix that is both irreducible and
aperiodic. Primitivity of P ∈ Rn×n is established by ensuring that the under-
lying graph of the network is strongly connected and aperiodicity follows from
the diagonal entries pjj[k] > 0 ∀j [27]. Given these properties, the Perron-
Frobenius Theorem for nonnegative matrices ensures that P has a single
eigenvalue of maximum modulus, e.g., λ1 = 1 and |λi| < 1 for i = 2, . . . , n.
Thus, the system can determine in a distributed manner the invariant
solution to
pi[k + 1] = P [k]pi[k], (2.7)
where pi[k] ∈ Rn are the DER contributions previously mentioned and the
weights of P [k] are potentially time-varying. Through a local exchange of
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information, the controllers at each node will asymptotically converge to a
steady-state solution piss where
∑
i pii[k] remains constant for all k. Moreover,
the solution piss has the form piss = αµ where α =
∑
i pii[0] and µ ∈ Rn is the
right eigenvector of P such that
∑
i µi = 1.
The authors in [28, 26] extend these results to develop a constrained version
of (2.7). The controllers are able to compute the ratio of demand to the
available capacity. This result is then multiplied by the available capacity at
each node to determine a solution that maintains the overall reactive power
demand for the system with respect to individual device capacities.
2.3.3 Fault Resilient Decentralized Voltage Control
Following the approach discussed in the previous section, the architecture
suggested in Fig. 2.1 is utilized in order to implement the controllers of each
node. DVC algorithm which is described in the previous section is imple-
mented exactly as distributed controller. Estimation methods and switching
policy that is implemented in estimation unit and switching module are ex-
plained in the rest of the section and control algorithm implemented in local
and hybrid controller is explained in the last part of this section.
Physical Connection and Estimation Unit
In power grids the most important physical connection between nodes is
through power lines. Following the basic results of circuit theory if bj ∈ Npi
then the following relation holds for Vi and Vj.
Vj = Vi + ZijIij (2.8)
In this equation, Vi and Vj are voltages of bi and bj, Zij is impedance of
the physical line between bi and bj, and Iij is the current flow from node
i to j. This equation indicates that if node i has a prior knowledge of the
impedance of the line lij ∈ Ep and it can measure the current flowing from
i to j, Iij, which is a local variable, above equation will estimate voltage of
node j based on a local state measurement of bi. Estimated voltage of bj
from bi’s point of view is called V
i
j .
In addition to voltage, another state parameter of remote nodes that is
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estimated by estimation unit of bi is the amount of reactive power needed to
correct the voltage limit violation at bus j ∈ Di, called piij[0]. In distributed
algorithm, at the beginning of every step r of the control algorithm, each bus
has to measure its local voltage and set the initial reactive power request,
pij[0], based on the following equation and then start sending out pij[0] to all
its neighbors.
pij[0] =

0.95V nomj −Vj
‖Npj ‖sjj if Vj ≤ 0.95V
nom
j
1.05V nomj −Vj
‖Npj ‖sjj if Vj ≥ 1.05V
nom
j
(2.9)
sjj is sensitivity of Vj to pij. Using estimated voltage of bj from following
equation, bi can also estimate pij[0]:
V ij = Vi + ZjiIji (2.10)
By using V ij , equation (2.9) can be written as:
piij[0] =

0.95V nomj −V ij
‖Npj ‖sjj if V
i
j ≤ 0.95V nomj + |emaxVj |
1.05V nomj −V ij
‖Npj ‖sjj if V
i
j ≥ 1.05V nomj − |emaxVj |
(2.11)
In the equation above, |emaxVj | represents maximum estimation error of volt-
age of bj from bi which can be measured through experiment on the real power
line between two neighbors.
Note that, ‖Npj ‖ and Sjj are static variables that do not change over the
operation. Thus, each node needs to have this prior knowledge before the
system starts.
Communicating Unit
Communication unit transmits data only if either distributed controller or
hybrid controller are activated. In either cases, two sets of data need to be
transmitted to all bj ∈ N ci . First, distributed controller output or hybrid
controller output which is for iterative distributed algorithm and second, lo-
cally measured voltage, Vi, received directly from sensor unit. The purpose
of sending periodic updates of Vi is that bjs can detect a failure in commu-
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nication by comparing Vi to V
j
i .
Switching Module and Switching Policy
Switching module reads V dataj from communication unit buffer to check if the
following inequality holds or not.
∀j ∈ N ci : |V dataj − V ij | ≤ emaxVj
V dataj is the value read from the buffer of communication unit for neighbor
j and V ij is estimated voltage of j. in other words, if a deviation more than
emaxVj occurs between estimated amount of Vj and the measurements received
through communication channel, a communication fault is declared.
Once a failure is detected by bi in the communication link with bj, bj
is removed from set of cyber neighbors of bi, N
c
i and is added to set of
disconnected neighbors of bi, Di. Then, bi does not send Vi to bj ∈ Di in
order to make them add bi into their disconnected nodes set, Dj. Finally,
based on the new N ci and Di, a switch is triggered.
Hybrid Controller Algorithm
This controller takes the control of the system when bi is categorized as a
partially connected node.
A partially connected node will participate in the iterative DVC algorithm
with its connected neighbors but it cannot exchange messages with the dis-
connected ones. Therefore, reactive power requests of disconnected nodes are
taken into account when initializing the pii[0]. If bi is a partially connected
node following equation is used to initialize pii[0]
pii[0] =

max({piij[0] sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
: bj ∈ Di} ∪ pii[0])
if pii[0] ≥ 0
min({piij[0] sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
: bj ∈ Di} ∪ pii[0])
if pii[0] < 0
(2.12)
In this equation, piij[0] is the amount of reactive power that node i estimates
to be needed by node j using equation (2.11). piij[0] is the reactive power
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needed by j ∈ Di that i estimates using equation (2.9). sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
splits piij[0]
among neighbors of j according to their sensitivities. Thus
sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
×piij[0]
is the fraction of piij[0] that i should produce.
In order to satisfy needs of all of j ∈ Di, maximum of sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
×piij[0] of
all the j ∈ Di is assigned to pii[0]. This would be able to regulate back voltages
of the bi and its disconnected neighbors to the permitted operational range.
Now that pii[0] is initialized, bi follows the DVC algorithm with initialized
values and communicates with bj ∈ N ci .
Local Controller Algorithm
This controller takes the control of the system when the node is a totally
disconnected node. Thus, it cannot communicate with any of its neighbors
which means that ‖N ci ‖ = 0 and ‖Npi ‖ = ‖Di‖. Following formula is the way
to calculate the reactive power for bi.
pii[0] =

max({piij[0] sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
: bj ∈ Di} ∪ pii[0] ∪ pimaxi )
if pii[0] ≥ 0
min({piij[0] sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
: bj ∈ Di} ∪ pii[0] ∪ pimini )
if pii[0] < 0
(2.13)
In this equation, piij[0] is the amount of reactive power that node i estimates
to be needed by node j using (2.11). piij[0] is the reactive power needed by
j ∈ Di that i estimates using (2.9). sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
splits piij[0] among neighbors
of j according to their sensitivities. Thus
sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
× piij[0] is the fraction
of piij[0] that i should produce.
In order to satisfy needs of all of j ∈ Di, maximum of sij∑
k∈Np
j
∪j skj
× piij[0]
of all the j ∈ Di is assigned to pii[0]. This would be able to regulate back
voltages of the bi and its disconnected neighbors to the permitted operational
range.
Note that in (2.13) this node does not participate in the iterative algorithm,
and therefore above calculated pii[0] is actually the reactive power that this
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node will produce at the end of cycle. Hence it cannot be more than pimaxi .
However in (2.12), the pii[0] is not the final amount of reactive power that
node i is going to produce. The node will use pii[0] calculated in (2.12) as
initial value to start the iterative DCV algorithm and finally will converge to
its final reactive power.
The algorithm suggested for local controller is based on the assumption
that neighbor nodes have similar situations; i.e. two physical neighbors can-
not be at the over voltage and under voltage situation at the same time. This
is a valid assumption in power networks [26].
Proof of Effectiveness
When communication channels are working properly in the power system, if
one of the nodes has extra reactive power request for voltage limit violation
correction, all the other nodes in the network are aware of it and can provide
the reactive power if they have extra capacity. In other words, it means
that the capacity which can be exploited to regulate voltage limit violation
is the sum of capacity of all the nodes in cyber-physical network to which
violating node is connected. However when a node cannot communicate with
network, it is only limited to its own reactive power production capacity. If
the required power exceeds its capacity, the node will not be able to regulate
its voltage.
Following theorem shows that proposed fault resilient architecture and
algorithms presented for hybrid and local controllers can still use the capacity
of immediate physical neighbors for voltage regulation, even though the node
is disconnected from the network. In this theorem, pinetj [r] represents the
amount of total reactive power that is produced by node j at step r of
operation.
Theorem 1: If node bi is a totally disconnected node suffering from under-
voltage situation, its voltage can be increased to permitted range of above
0.95V nominal iff Σj∈Ni∪i(pi
max
j − pinetj [r])× sij ≥ (0.95V nominal − Vi)
Proof: In undervoltage mode, Vi is smaller than 0.95V
nominal. In order to
regulate the voltage to the permitted range, total injected reactive power by
neighbors should increase the Vi at least by 0.95V
nominal − Vi. At each step
m after r, following linear equation between reactive power, sensitivities and
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voltage changes holds:
∆Vi[r +m] =
∑
{j:j∈Npi ∪i∧pinetj [r+m]≤pimaxj [r+m]}
sij ×∆pij[r +m] (2.14)
Based on the algorithm described in the previous sections, neighbors of i will
increase their reactive power production if bi is still in undervoltage situation.
Not being able to regulate the voltage of bi means that bi is still overvoltaged
while {j : j ∈ Npi ∪ i ∧ pinetj [r +m] ≤ pimaxj [r +m]} is empty. In other words,
there is no neighbor left who still has the capacity to increase its reactive
power production. However, this is impossible because
n∑
p=r
∆Vi[k] =
n∑
p=r
∑
{j:j∈Npi ∪i∧pinetj [r+m]≤pimaxj [r+m]}
sij ×∆pij[p]
If pj is the step in which neighbor j reaches its maximum capacity, then we
have ∆pij[p] = 0 for p > pj then we have rest of the above equation as follows:
∑
j∈{Npi ∪i}
n∑
p=r
sij ×∆pij[p] =
∑
j∈{Npi ∪i}
sij ×
n∑
p=r
∆pij[p]
since all the nodes have reached their maximum capacity, we have:
∑
j∈Npi ∪i
sij ×
n∑
p=r
∆pij[p] =
∑
j∈Npi ∪i
sij × (pimaxj − pinetj [r])
Based on the assumption in the theorem 1, we have :
n∑
p=r
∆Vi[k] ≥ (0.95V nominal − Vi)
This states that the amount of voltage increase is more than what is needed
by node i to resolve the undervoltage situation.

Theorem 2: If node bi is a totally disconnected node suffering from over-
voltage situation, its voltage can be decreased to permitted range of under
1.05V nominal iff Σj∈Ni∪i(pi
min
j − pinetj [r])× sij ≤ (1.05V nominal − Vi)
Proof: The proof is similar to theorem 1. 
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2.4 Test Scenarios
In this section two different communication failure scenarios are presented.
Effects of each scenario on the system with unmodified decentralized voltage
control algorithm and the system with our fault resilient architecture are
demonstrated and voltage and reactive power graphs are presented.
Power network used for these examples is a 8-bus distribution network
shown in Fig. 2.2.
Feeder
1 2 3 4 5
6
7
Figure 2.2: 8-Bus Distribuion Network
Voltage to reactive power sensitivity matrix for this network is:
S = 10−2 ×

0.5384 0.5388 0.5396 0.5398 0.5399 0.5397 0.5397
0.5388 1.3183 1.3201 1.3206 1.3209 1.3204 1.3205
0.5396 1.3201 2.8303 2.8313 2.8320 2.8308 2.8310
0.5398 1.3206 2.8313 3.6888 3.6897 2.8318 2.8320
0.5399 1.3209 2.8320 3.6897 5.3016 2.8325 2.8327
0.5397 1.3204 2.8308 2.8318 2.8325 3.5155 3.5158
0.5397 1.3205 2.8310 2.8320 2.8327 3.5158 4.4361

Assuming zero sensitivity for the nodes that are not immediate neighbors,
we have:
S = 10−2 ×

0.5384 0.5388 0 0 0 0 0
0.5388 1.3183 1.3201 0 0 0 0
0 1.3201 2.8303 2.8313 0 2.8308 0
0 0 2.8313 2.6888 3.6897 0 0
0 0 0 3.6897 5.3016 0 0
0 0 2.8308 0 0 3.5155 3.5158
0 0 0 0 0 3.5158 4.4361

For the following test scenarios, sensitivities extracted from S are used.
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(a) Voltages of buses
(b) Reactive power of buses
Figure 2.3: Scenario 1, b1-b2 and b2-b3 communication channel failure, DVC
algorithm
2.4.1 Scenario 1, Single Communication Fault
In this scenario, two communication channels b1-b2 and b2-b3 have failed si-
multaneously. Once a disconnection is detected by b1 and b3, they remove
it from N c1 and N
c
3 and add it to D1 and D3. At this point, b2 removes b1
and b3 from N
c
2 and adds them to D2. At this point, ‖N c1‖ = 0 and we
have ‖N c2‖ = 0 since both of its neighbors are disconnected. Therefore b1 is
categorized as totally disconnected nodes. For b3, since it has ‖N c3‖ = 2 and
‖D3‖ = 1 therefore it is categorized as a partially disconnected node. Rest
of the nodes are still categorized as totally connected.
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(a) Voltages of buses
(b) Reactive power of buses
Figure 2.4: Scenario 1, b1-b2 and b2-b3 communication channel failure, fault
resilient DVC algorithm
This failure detection causes switching module in b1 and b2 to trigger a
switch from distributed controller to the local controller and in b3 to trigger
a switch from distributed controller to the hybrid controller.
Having the sensor failures described above in the network, voltage in the
slack bus drops down to 0.94Vnom which causes undervoltages in all of the
nodes in the network. Fig. 2.3 and 2.4 show the voltages and reactive power
productions of the nodes after this voltage drop occurs in slack bus.
Fig. 2.3 shows the voltage and reactive power production graphs when
original decentralized voltage control algorithm is used. In this example
voltage of slack bus is set to 0.94 which causes undervoltage in all the nodes
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as seen in the initial point of the Fig. 2.4.a. As it is seen, after 350 iterations,
b1 reaches its maximum capacity while it is still in the undervoltage situation
and b2 has the capacity which can be used to increase V1. Because there is
no communication channel that b2 and rest of network receive reactive power
request of b1.
Voltage and reactive power production graphs under fault resilient voltage
control algorithm, are shown in fig. 2.4. As soon as the undervoltage occurs,
nodes start to detect it and increase their reactive power production until
their voltages are increased up to the permitted range. After about 80 itera-
tions b2 has reached its maximum reactive power production while it is still
in undervoltage situation and after 120 iterations b1 reaches its maximum
capacity.
Based on theorem1, the capacity that can be used for voltage regulation
in a totally disconnected node, is limited to its immediate physical neighbors
capacity. At this point, the only neighbor of b1 which b2 and it has zero
capacity left. Hence
∑
j∈Ni sij ×∆pij[r] = 0 which means that no further
voltage increase can be expected for b1. However, voltage of b2, although it
has reached its maximum capacity, is still being increased. That is because,
its partially connected neighbor, b3, using estimation detects the undervolt-
age situation of b2 and increases its reactive power production request until
V2 reaches the permitted voltage range of above 0.95VNominal.
2.4.2 Scenario 2, Communication Fault
In this example, communication channel connecting b1 to b2 has failed which
results in b1 being disconnected from rest of the network.
Fig. 2.5, shows voltage and reactive power of the nodes under the original
decentralized voltage control algorithm. Due to 0.94V nominal voltage in slack
bus, all the nodes are initially in undervoltage situation and therefore increase
their reactive power production. b1 is the only disconnected node in this
network and can only exploit its own reactive production capacity in order
to regulate its voltage. After 350 iterations, it reaches its maximum capacity
while it is still in undervoltage situation and no further voltage increase
occurs due to lack of communication.
Under the fault resilient voltage control algorithm, b1 does not receive
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(a) Voltages of buses
(b) Reactive power of buses
Figure 2.5: Scenario 2, b1-b2 communication channel failure, DVC algorithm
any communication from b2 and therefore removes b2 from N
c
1 and adds
it to D1. Since b2 is the only neighbor, node is categorized as a totally
disconnected node after this point and switching module triggers the switch
from distributed controller to local controller. Similarly, b2 does not receive
any packet from b1 and removes b1 from N2 and adds it to D2. Because N
c
2
is not empty, b2 is categorized as a partially disconnected node. Therefore,
switching module switches from complex to safety controller.
As seen in the Fig. 2.6, all the nodes increase their reactive power in
order to increase their voltages. After 100 iterations, b1 and b2 reach their
maximum reactive production capacity both at the same time (reactive power
production graphs of b1 and b2 are very close to each other) however, because
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(a) Voltages of buses
(b) Reactive power of buses
Figure 2.6: Scenario 2, b1-b2 communication channel failure, fault resilient
DVC algorithm
b2 is a partially connected node and can estimate the undervoltage situation
in b1, following the algorithm, reports the need to the connected nodes in
the network. As seen in the graph, b3 starts to increase its reactive power
production after this point in order to increase the voltage of b1 and b2. After
b3 reaches the maximum capacity, b4 and b6 start to increase reactive power
production until b1 comes back to the permitted voltage range.
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2.5 Conclusion
Communication faults can cause irreparable damages to infrastructures of
cyber-physical system and especially power grids. In this chapter, we tried
to introduce the concept of using a combination of physical measurements
and estimation methods in order to detect and handle these faults. In order
to detect communication faults, the idea of estimation and comparison is
applicable in all the systems that designer can find estimation methods using
physical connections. However, handling these faults depends on number of
the state variables of remote nodes that can be estimated.
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CHAPTER 3
RUN-TIME CHECKING TO PROVIDE
SAFETY AND PROGRESS
3.1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) combine networked communication along with
interactions with the physical world. We consider a CPS scenario consisting
of several embedded computing components each interacting and sensing the
physical world and communicating with a central coordinator over an unre-
liable channel, such as wireless or the Internet. These low-level controllers
attempt to accomplish some task in a coordinated fashion. Since the physical
world is being manipulated, it is essential that the supervisory control logic is
carefully designed and satisfies strict safety requirements. For example, au-
tonomous vehicles may use wireless to communicate their positions and alter
their future routes, but vehicles should never collide despite the potential for
an unbounded number of message drops. This system is difficult to reason
about because both (1) the communication layer can experience unbounded
message delays and drops, and (2) the dynamics of the physical world are
represented by interacting relationships in a continuous space.
An example of a distributed CPS is autonomous coordinated vehicle mo-
tion. A set of vehicles is moving through a shared physical space, and the
user would like to be able to make run-time changes to the routes of the vehi-
cles, while guaranteeing that a formation is maintained and vehicles will not
collide. Since messages may be lost over wireless, any new route command
may arrive at some vehicles but not at others. Acknowledgments will not
solve this problem, since acknowledgments may also sometimes be lost. As
in distributed systems with lossy communication, it is impossible to achieve
consensus in this system [2]. Despite this inherent limitation, by using the
proposed approach we can ensure the safety invariant that the vehicle flock is
always maintained and collisions are avoided. If the communication channel
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eventually delivers packets, we can also provide the notion of progress that
gives the user the ability to safely change the routes at run-time.
In the context of a distributed CPS, a designer is typically interested in
two properties: safety and progress. A proof of safety will guarantee that the
system will never enter an undesirable state. We formally specify safety as a
predicate on the variables of the agents of the distributed CPS which is true
at all times (a safety invariant). The notion of progress that we consider is
that, roughly speaking, all the agents will receive and follow a desired goal
command in finite time. The ultimate guarantee that we provide is that the
system will remain safe at all times (even if the network fails), while being
able to meet the progress property as long as the communication network is
functioning.
The scope of this chapter will be the verification of the high-level control
logic of the distributed CPS, and not the verification of the individual con-
trollers. We will therefore assume that the implementation of the individual
low-level controllers is correct and bug-free. For example, upon receiving
a command message, a low-level controller will follow that command as in-
tended. Ensuring this is also non-trivial, but it is likely a more tractable
problem for formal design approaches since each low-level system contains
less variables than the composed system. Additionally, techniques such as
the Simplex architecture [7, 29] may be used to guarantee certain behavior
properties for low-level controllers, even if the complete controller is directly
verifiable.
An overview of the type of distributed CPS we consider is shown in Figure
3.1. The key enabler of our safety result is the realization that, if the network
is assumed to be unreliable, individual low-level controllers need be able to
maintain global safety even in that case that packets do not arrive. Safety
here means that a given predicate on the state space will evaluate to true
over all time. We propose a Runtime Command Monitor which is interposed
between the supervisory control logic and the network, as shown in the figure.
If the supervisory control logic attempts to send control commands which,
for any amount of message delay, can lead to a system state that violates the
safety predicate, the Runtime Command Monitor will prevent the command
from being sent. We show that this design results in a fail-safe system. The
main technical challenge that we will elaborate on is to determine the exact
behavior for the Runtime Command Monitor for a particular distributed
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Figure 3.1: A Runtime Command Monitor ensures safety for the
distributed cyber-physical system.
CPS system.
Since the network is unreliable, control commands which are sent from the
supervisory logic may never arrive at a low-level controller. In order to be
able to update the system behavior based on run-time information (progress),
therefore, a stronger requirement must be imposed upon the network. As
long as messages eventually arrive, we also provide a means to guarantee
system progress while maintaining safety. To do this, we must ensure that
commands that are sent out maintain the safety invariant both in the case
where the command arrives and the new control strategy is used, and in the
case where the command is indefinitely delayed. This notion of safe potential
divergence is captured as compatible actions. We show that time-insensitive
system progress properties can be guaranteed by constructing finite chains
of compatible actions which end with the final desired system action.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We prove that run-time properties provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for safety in a distributed CPS system. By encoding these
checks into a Runtime Command Monitor, a fail-safe system can be
developed (Section 3.2).
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• We provide sufficient conditions for providing time-insensitive progress
guarantees. This requires constructing a chain of compatible actions,
as well as a network which eventually delivers packets that are sent.
(Section 3.3)
• We apply both of these approaches to a simulation of a coordinated
vehicle flocking system. In addition to demonstrating the guarantees of
safety and progress, we evaluate the overhead of the Runtime Command
Monitor. (Section 3.4)
3.2 Providing Safety
In this section, we use hybrid input/output automata to formalize the no-
tion of a distributed networked control system with arbitrary delays and
packetloss. We then prove a general theorem which is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for the safety of such systems. We then apply the theo-
rem by stating the run-time checks in order to maintain system invariants,
which will be encoded into the Runtime Command Monitor in the proposed
architecture.
3.2.1 Hybrid I/O Automata
Hybrid input/output automata are general models for systems consisting of
discrete and continuous states, where the discrete states are governed by
transition rules, and the continuous states evolve according to differential
equations. There is also input and output in these systems, which allows
easy composition of different components into a larger system.
Rather than explaining the full semantics for hybrid I/O automata, we
provide a brief overview of only the most important aspects here, and refer
an interested reader to a more comprehensive review [30, 31].
A hybrid I/O automaton consists of four parts: variables, transitions, tra-
jectories, and actions. Variables are the discrete or continuous entities of
an automaton, for example velocity or mode. A state of an automaton is a
specific valuation of the variables. Transitions provide the behavior of the
discrete variables in the system. These have an enabling precondition and
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an effect. The state after the effect is applied is called the post state of the
transition. Preconditions specify when transitions can occur, but generally
automata are not forced to take a transition, which can create nondeter-
minism. Trajectories give the behavior of the continuous variables in the
system as time passes, typically using differential equations, and systems can
also have nondeterministic dynamics described by nondeterministic differen-
tial equations. The conditions under which time can not advance are given
as stop conditions, which can be used to force an enabled transition to occur.
Finally, actions indicate the interaction points for external communication
with other automata. An action will always have a corresponding transition
in the automaton. An action can occur when both automata that have the
action satisfy the corresponding transitions’ preconditions.
Time passes for a hybrid automata when a trajectory is acting upon the
continuous variables. During the execution, there can be discrete jumps in
state caused by the transitions. For two hybrid I/O automata with compat-
ible actions, say A and B, we denote their composition using A||B.
3.2.2 System Definition
We model our supervisory control system as a network of communicating
hybrid I/O automata. In this network, there is an automaton describing
the behavior of each of the N agents in the system, A1, A2, . . . , AN , and an
automaton which models the communication channel. This model is slightly
more general than the one discussed earlier with an explicit supervisory con-
troller. Here, we could arbitrary choose one of the agents to be the supervisor.
In this section, we are concerned with verifying that a predicate is a safety
invariant for a system. That is, we are provided with a safety predicate on
the states of the agent automata. The predicate is an invariant if it evaluates
to true for all reachable states of the system from a given initial state (an
unsafe state can not be reached). A system is a composition of the agent
hybrid I/O automata and the communication automaton.
For our unreliable network, we consider a communication automaton with
weak guarantees about message delivery, named Cweak, which can delay each
message arbitrarily long, or drop it. Such an automaton matches the commu-
nication properties of many networked or wireless communication systems.
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automaton CommWeak(M : Type )
type Packet = tuple o f message : M, delay : Real , dest : Nat
variables
bag : Bag [ Packet ] := [ ] ,
now : Real := 0
actions
send (m: M, dest : Nat ) ,
r e c e i v e (m: M, dest : Nat )
transitions
send (m, dest ) // not in CommDrop
ef fect
bag := i n s e r t ( [m, now+rand ( ) , dest ]
send (m, dest ) // not in CommStrong
ef fect
/∗ dropped ∗/
r e c e i v e (m, dest )
precondition
conta ins ( bag , [m, 0 , dest ] )
ef fect
remove ( bag , [m, 0 , dest ] )
trajectories
stop when
∃p : Packet p ∈ bag ∧ (now = p . dead l ine )
evolve
d(now) = 1
Figure 3.2: The Cweak communication automaton assigns messages
arbitrary delays and can drop messages. Here, rand() returns a nonnegative
real number.
The automaton description for Cweak is given in Figure 3.2. Here, there are
two possible send transitions, either of which can be applied when a message
is sent out. The first one assigns a real-valued arrival time greater than the
current time. The second one silently drops the packet. We also will consider
two other communication scenarios, Cdrop and Cstrong. In Cdrop, the first send
transition of Cweak is omitted so all messages get dropped. In Cstrong, the sec-
ond send transition is omitted, so that all messages can only be arbitrarily
delayed, but never dropped. A communication automaton would be com-
posed with each of the agent automata by connecting the receive transition
with destination i to Agent Ai. All the agents would invoke the same send
transition.
3.2.3 Safety Theorem
In order to prove a predicate P is an invariant for a system given a definition
for each agent automaton and the communication automaton, a standard
approach is to check that the invariant is satisfied for every transition and
every trajectory. During this process, the invariant may need to strengthened
in order for the proof to follow.
The standard approach for proving invariants, however, can be difficult to
apply. Since reasoning is done ahead of time, the analysis must be applicable
34
to all states which can be encountered for each rule.
In this chapter, we present an alternative approach for creating invariant-
satisfying systems. Here, we will use a combination of static reasoning done
ahead of time along with run-time checks. With this approach, we can some-
times guarantee an invariant in an easier manner than by using the normal,
static-only approach. Rather than reasoning over sets of possible values, we
instead move part of the checking to run-time, and can therefore use a specific
value in a specific message. In order to do this, however, we need to prove a
theorem which provides an equivalent condition for verifying invariants.
A system is described by a composition of the automaton for each of the
agents (AN = A1||A2|| . . . ||AN) and the automaton for the communication
channel. A property P is the predicate we are trying to show is an invariant,
and is a predicate on the states of the agents, P : AN →{true, false}.
Theorem. A predicate P is an invariant for a system S = AN ||Cweak if
and only if (1) P is an invariant for the system S ′ = AN ||Cdrop, and (2) from
any post state of a receive transition in S, P is preserved by the system
ANpost||Cdrop, where ANpost is the composed agent automata AN starting in the
post state of the receive transition.
Proof. First we show the direction that if conditions (1) and (2) hold, the
invariant is satisfied by the original system.
The proof of this statement is based on the observation that at every point
in time, either no messages have been received, or there is a most-recently
received message by one of the agents. As shown in Figure 3.3, for every
possible trace there will be some amount of time where no messages have
been received by any of the agents in the system, followed by a intervals of
time where there is a most-recently received message.
Our proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume ti is the first time at which
P is evaluates to false in S. If ti occurs before the first message is received,
this means that P would also evaluate to false in S ′ at time ti, since up to
this point the behavior of S and S ′ is identical. This violates condition (1).
Therefore ti occurs at or after a message has been received and processed.
Let tm be the time of the most-recently processed message before time ti
(the time at which the receive transition was invoked in Cweak). We apply
condition (2) of the theorem at time tm and take A
N
post as the composed
agent automata in the post state of the receive transition in S. Since in S,
P evaluates to false before any further messages are received after tm, this
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Time
m1
received
m4
received
m3
received
Condition 
(1)
Condition (2)
applied to m1
0
Condition (2)
applied to m4
Condition (2)
applied to m3
Figure 3.3: For every trace, at each time instant, either no message has
been received in the system, or there is a most-recently received message.
would mean it also evaluates to false for the system with agent automata
ANpost and a communication automaton which does not receive any messages.
This is exactly the case checked by condition (2).
Next we show the other direction, that if a predicate P is an invariant for
S, conditions (1) and (2) will hold. Again, we proceed by contradiction.
Assume condition (1) does not hold but P is an invariant of S. The
behaviors of Cdrop can be exactly simulated by Cweak, which means that P
can not be an invariant for S.
Next, assume the second case that condition (2) does not hold but P is
an invariant for S. In the context of the false case of condition (2), let time
tm be the time at which the receive transition is invoked. Now consider a
communication automaton which produces an identical behavior as S until
tm and then no longer receives messages. This behavior can also be exactly
simulated by Cweak (by taking the dropping send transition for messages
which would originally have an arrival time after tm), which means that P
can not be an invariant for S.
Since both cases yield contradictions, if an invariant is satisfied in the
original system, conditions (1) and (2) must also hold.
The two conditions of the theorem are therefore both necessary and suffi-
cient for proving an invariant is satisfied for a system with unreliable com-
munication over all time.
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3.2.4 Application of Theorem to Runtime Monitoring
From a static-time analysis perspective, the theorem does not gain us very
much since condition (2) needs to be evaluated every time any message can
be received, which is difficult to reason about. However, at run-time, con-
dition (2) may be easier to verify. This is the approach advocated, to check
condition (1) at system design time and condition (2) at run-time, which by
the theorem will guarantee that P is an invariant of the system.
One challenge of this approach is that the necessary run-time analysis
needs to be automated in software, which is done in our architecture in the
Command Filter Safeguard. Since there may be nondeterminism from the
dynamics of the agents, and since in general this may involve an infinite-time
reachability computation, this may be easy or hard depending on the specific
system.
In terms of applicability, one main concern that we will evaluate further in
our case study in Section 3.4is the run-time overhead of the approach, which
is application-specific. If we consider a typical case of time-invariant systems
where low-level controllers are stable from a control-theoretic sense, and the
commands are new set points, the potential area the agent may enter given
some unknown delay consists of the states it will encounter while transition-
ing from the old set point to the new one, projected over all future time
(since delay is unknown). To check condition (2), this would be computed
and checked with the future states the other agents may enter against the
safety predicate.
Another consideration is to specify the action to take if the analysis for
the specific message indicates condition (2) is not satisfied at run-time. The
system can not be allowed to take action based on the message, since it may
lead to a state which violates the invariant. In our proposed design, these
messages are filtered (never sent out) by the Runtime Command Monitor.
This preserves condition (2) for the system (since no messages will be sent
out unless (2) is satisfied) which guarantees that P will continue to be an
invariant for the system. Of course dropping messages can adversely affect
system progress, but it will only be done to maintain safety (if the predicate
captures a notion of safety). In Section 3.3, we present sufficient conditions
to guarantee progress which require, among other things, a stronger com-
munication automaton, where messages can be delayed arbitrarily but not
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dropped.
Since the Runtime Command Monitor drops messages at send time, it
needs to reason about possible system states when the packet will be received
(since condition (2) deals with the system state upon message reception, not
sending). This also may be challenging because, for unrestricted systems,
it involves reasoning about which messages may be sent out in the future
before the arrival time of the message, and possible message reordering. For
example, in Figure 3.3, message m4 arrives before message m3. The run-
time analysis at the send time of message m3 needs to take this possible
reordering into account. Also, in an unrestricted system, these messages can
be sent from and arrive at different agents (for example m3 may be from
Agent 1 to Agent 2, while m4 is from Agent 3 to Agent 4). For specific
systems, however, this analysis may be simpler. For example, systems which
maintain sequence numbers in messages and only take actions on the most-
recent messages received, do not have to consider reordering. Systems like the
supervisory control system we are considering have a single entity which sends
command messages, and therefore we do not need to reason about command
messages exchanged between other agents. As matches our intuition, having
guaranteed orders of packet delivery produces systems that are easier to
predict and prove correct, whether using the standard static-time approach
or our run-time technique. Condition (2) of the theorem demonstrates this,
while, at the same time, tells us what would need to be checked for the more
general case.
3.3 Guaranteeing Progress
We will now describe a manner in which we can guarantee a time-insensitive
notion of safe system progress. We assume a more specific CPS model here
where each agent is running a stable closed-loop controller.
First, we discuss the distributed control system architecture that we con-
sider more specifically in Section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 defines the notion of
compatible actions in the context of the distributed control system and pro-
poses methods of checking compatibility. In Section 3.3.3, we then show
scheme of coordinated control that guarantees safety according to our earlier
result from Section 3.2. Finally, Section 3.3.4 proves progress of the system
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under a stronger assumption of the communication layer.
3.3.1 Controller Architecture
As before, we consider a distributed control system consisting of a collection
of N agents with a central coordinator. We assume that each agent receives
commands only from the central coordinator. Each Agent Ai has a local
controller and a variable set point Si. The set point of Agent Ai can be
changed through communication with the central coordinator. In general, a
set point indicates a single or a sequence of (i) actions Ai will take, or (ii) goal
states Ai moving towards. For simplicity, in this section we will assume Si is
a single goal position of Ai. That is, the local controller of Agent Ai drives
the agent’s continuous variables to move towards the set point Si. When
agent Ai reaches an -ball around the set point (for some fixed ), agent Ai
will report its arrival to the central coordinator be sending a progress update
message. The central coordinator will then, upon receiving arrival messages
from all the agents, send each agent its next set point. An execution of Agent
Ai can therefore be viewed as a hybrid sequence ηi = waiti[0]y receive[1]y
τi[1] y send y waiti[1] y receive[2] y τi[2] y send y waiti[2] . . . , where
(i) each τi[k] is a trajectory moving to a particular set point Si[k], (ii) send is
the Agent sending the progress update message, (iii) waiti[k] is a trajectory
when waiting for next set point, where agent Ai stays within the -ball of
Si[k], and (iv) receive[k] is an action invoked by the central coordinator’s
send action, during which the set point of agent Ai is changed from Si[k− 1]
to Si[k]. In each trajectory τi[k], the initial state and the final state of the
trajectory are within -balls of successive set points of Ai. A global set point
is defined as a collection of the local set points for each of the N agents, and
is denoted as SN .
In this section we are concerned with progress, but the progress must be
made cognisant of safety. As in Section 3.2, safety is defined in terms of a
predicate PS. The progress property is defined using a global set point SNfinal.
The formal notion of progress we prove is that each agent will, in finite time,
reach within an -ball around its set point in SNfinal, while always having PS
evaluate to true.
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3.3.2 Compatibility and Stability
Section 3.2 showed that in order to ensure safety, the central coordinator
needs to reason about future states of Ai, and will therefore issue set points
according to the states Ai can reach. Reasoning about future states of Ai
can be done using reachability analysis. We denote Reachi[k] as the set of
reachable state of Ai under trajectory τi[k]. The reachable set of the global
system (the composed behavior of all the agents) is denoted as ReachN .
For safety of the system, we need to verify that ReachN satisfies the safety
predicate PS. Recall that a trajectory τi[k] of Ai depends on two set points,
Si[k − 1] and Si[k], of Ai. For a specific set point Si[k], we check whether
PS remains true over the composed Reach
N [k] by computing the reachable
set of states for each of the other agents. This property of safety for a new
global set point captures the a notion of compatible actions.
Definition SN [k] and SN [k+1] are said to be pairwise compatible actions
if the global state xN ∈ ReachN [k] always satisfies PS when every Ai moves
along a trajectory defined by Si[k] and Si[k + 1].
The notion of compatible actions can also be generalized to n-way com-
patible actions. That is, given n collections of set points, we can say they
are n-way compatible if the global state always satisfies PS when every agent
moves along a trajectory defined by any pair of the set points. Due the extra
requirements, however, it is generally easier to construct chains of pairwise
compatible actions. For this chapter we will use pairwise compatibility, and
perhaps investigate applications of n-way compatible action chains in future
research.
3.3.3 Safety Guaranteed Run-Time Checking
We assume low-level controllers which are locally exponentially stable, and
start from a safe global set point.
Definition. A controller is said to be locally exponentially stable with
respect to a set point, if there exist a neighborhood of the set point such that
any trajectories starting from any state in a neighborhood of the set point,
eventually converge to the set point. In addition, the distance between the
trajectory and the set point decays exponentially over time.
We will now formally state the behavior of the supervisory control logic:
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𝑆𝑖[𝑘] 
𝐿𝑖[𝑘] 
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𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖[𝑘 + 1] 
Figure 3.4: An execution trace in which Aireceives set points Si[k − 1],
Si[k], and Si[k + 1] in sequence.
(1) Until receiving progress report updates from all the agents, indicating
that each agent is within an -ball of the current way point SN [k], the central
coordinator will not send any new set points.
(2) The server computes a new set of set point SN [k+1] following conditions
below, and issues them to the corresponding agents.
(2a) The global set point SN [k + 1] should be compatible with the global
set point SN [k]. That is, the reach set or its overapproximation does not
violate the predicate PS.
(2b) For each agent, the -ball of its way point in Si[k] should be contained
by the region of attraction of its way point in Si[k+ 1], to guarantee that the
next set point will be reached by the low-level controller.
We now prove that safety predicate PS is an invariant of the system, using
the theorem from Section 3.2.
(1) If all packets get dropped at the beginning, the way points never change
and PS remains true.
(2) Suppose that after a packet get delivered, all follow-up packets get
dropped. The server will stop sending new set points since not all reports
are received. No agent will further update its set point since the coordinator
will not send any new set points. Agent i’s states will be remain in the pair-
wise compatible reach set, for the current way point, forever. By pair-wise
compatibility, PS will remain true.
By (1) and (2), we conclude that PS is an invariant of the system.
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3.3.4 Progress Guarantee
We will now discuss a sufficient condition to guarantee system progress. For-
mally, we want the system reach a target global set point SNfinal in some finite
amount of time.
To guarantee progress, we require three requirements. First, messages in
the network can only get delayed arbitrarily long, but can not be dropped.
For this assumption we will use automaton Cstrong, as described in Section
3.2.2. In practice, this can be done by having a low-level network layer which
keeps resending packets until an acknowledgment is received, assuming the
connection will eventually get reestablished. Second, there is a finite chain
of pairwise compatible actions (which we call a compatible action chain)
from the current state to the target global set point SNfinal. Third, the local
controllers for each agent are exponentially stable for each set point in the
compatible action chain.
We will now prove that the system AN ||Cstrong meets our progress require-
ment. Recall that agent Ai’s execution is a hybrid trace ηi = waiti[0] y
receive[1] y τi[1] y send y waiti[1] y receive[2] y τi[2] y send y
waiti[2] . . . . First, τi[k] is a trajectory starting from an -ball of Si[k − 1] to
an -ball of the Si[k]. Since we assumed the local controller is exponentially
stable, the distance between the continuous state of Ai and the set point is
exponentially decaying. Thus, any -ball of the set point will be reached in
a finite time (depending on the constant in the exponential). Second, a send
action through Cstrong takes finite delivery time to invoke a receive action of
the coordinator. Since this is true for all agents, the coordinator will receive
all the reports of progress in a finite time. At this point the next set point
will be sent back to Ai. This sending also takes a finite time since it is done
by Cstrong. Due to this, the waiti[k] trajectory where Ai is waiting for a new
way point has a finite duration. Finally, since by the second requirement the
chain of pair-wise compatible actions is finite, the target SNfinal is reachable
through finitely many of these steps. By this reasoning, we conclude that
the execution of ηi will reach SNfinal in a finite amount of time.
A system designer may want a stronger guarantee of progress that the final
set point will be reached by all agents some exact amount of time (rather
than just finite). In order to prove these stronger progress properties, we
can adapt the same proof as above, while imposing limits on each of the
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steps which were previously only required to take finite time. If the network
guarantees packet delivery with a worst-case transmission time, and we know
the exponential constants of our locally exponentially stable controllers, we
can compute the maximum amount of time it can take for the system to
go from one known way point Si[k − 1] to the next known waypoint Si[k].
Given this, we can compute the maximum amount of time for the system to
complete the entire compatible action chain, by summing up the maximums
for each pairs of compatible actions. In this way, the maximum amount of
time that can elapse before reaching the final set point can also be calculated.
3.4 Coordinated Vehicle Flocking
In this section, we describe a vehicle coordination case study, where a single
operator controls multiple vehicles over wireless. This is inspired by experi-
mental off-road agriculture vehicle systems currently being investigated [32].
Many agriculture tasks, such as plowing, seeding, and harvesting, require a
vehicle, or a fleet of vehicles, to perform a covering of the field. By using
automation, the operating cost of such a system can be reduced since less
people are required to run the equipment. Additionally, productivity and
efficiency may also be improved since GPS-provided actuation may be more
precise than what humans would achieve on their own, and since a large
number of vehicles can be used at a time.
However, since vehicles need to use wireless in order to exchange control
commands, care needs to be taken to show that this unreliable component
can not cause, for example, collisions. This imposes a challenge since, with
unreliable communication, coming to a consensus amongst all the vehicles is
impossible [2].
We consider the following system. A group of autonomous vehicles travel
in formation along a path. There is a single operator in the center vehicle
who can, at run time, attempt to modify the flock’s route by entering a
detour point. The new, desired path takes the flock to the detour point,
and then back again to the original path. Multiple detour points can be
entered during operation. A simple case showing the potential danger in
such a system is shown in Figure 3.5. Here, the detour point is shown as
a red circle. If packets are lost, there are four potential locations where a
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(a) Dotted lines indicate desired paths.
(b) The top vehicle has not received the updated
path.
Figure 3.5: When the desired path is not received by a vehicle, collisions
can result
collision can occur.
In the rest of this section, we will exploit the approaches described in the
previous sections in order to create the supervisory control logic for such a
system with the following guarantees:
• Vehicles do not collide with each other under packet loss or arbitrary
packet delays.
• Despite packet losses or delays, all the vehicles end up in a pre-agreed
location called Pfinal.
• The flock formation of the vehicles is maintained.
The central coordinator logic is physically on one of the vehicles which we
call the leader. The leader is in charge of interacting with the operator, and
generates control commands for each of the followers to be sent over wireless.
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(a) interPath 1
(b) interPath 2
(c) interPath 3
(d) interPath 4
Figure 3.6: In this image, a set of intermediate paths are shown for a pair
of vehicles. Dotted paths are the new paths that are generated and solid
paths are the ones whose progress update has already been sent.
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As described in Section 3.3, rather than immediately sending the final path
to the followers, the leader will generate intermediate paths that are pairwise
compatible and incrementally get closer to the desired path, as shown in
Figure 3.6. In this way, wireless can be lost at any time and the system
will remain safe, whereas if the wireless network works, the desired path will
eventually be reached.
Every time new paths are generated by the leader, the Runtime Command
Monitor will check the reachable region of each vehicle. Here, the reachable
states for a vehicle are all the points that the vehicle can reach after it receives
this new path. It therefore not only includes the new path of the vehicle,
but also all the area in between the old path and new path that the vehicle
might enter during the transition from the old path to new path. Once this
region is calculated for each vehicle, if there is no intersection between the
reachable regions, all the new paths can be sent out. If this check is false we
generate a new intermediate path that is closer to the original path of the
vehicles, and rerun the checks.
This method provides safety because no matter if the new path is received
or dropped for any of the followers, the flock not collide because all the
possible regions that the vehicle can reach were included in the reachable
set and already checked for safety. At every step, the intermediate paths
that are generated for the followers will be sent out only if all the progress
update reports from all the other followers for all the previous paths have
been received. As long as there is a vehicle that has not sent the progress
update, the leader will keep sending the same path to the vehicle which has
yet to report it is on the new path.
We will now give the technical details for the generation of a compatible
action chain which can guarantee progress and safety. We first describe the
generation of the desired path (which goes through the detour point), and
then the computation of intermediate paths that form a pairwise compatible
action chain to reach the desired path.
3.4.1 Desired Path Generation
Upon receiving a new detour point from operator, the leader will generate
desiredPathi which is a path from the current position of the vehicle i to
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the detour point and back from the detour point to the original path, which
ends at the pre-agreed endpoint Pfinal. For instance, the last path in the
Figure 3.6 generated for the leader and follower is their desired path. In
our implementation, we generate Bezier curves [33] to give a smooth path
that transitions from the original path, touches the detour point, and then
smoothly transitions back to the original path.
3.4.2 Intermediate Path Generation
After generating the desired path for each vehicle, the leader can not generally
send this path directly to followers because, similar to the situation in Figure
3.5, the current paths and the desired paths are not compatible (with respect
to the safety predicate). Therefore, we iteratively use smaller substeps until
we can generate a chain of compatible intermediate paths.
The path desiredPathi consists of n segments with n + 1 way points in
which desiredPathi[0] is the current position of follower fi, desiredPathi[n]
is the pre-agreed endpoint Pfinal, and one of the way points of this path equals
to newly-entered detour point (or more strictly the point in the formation
where follower i should be when the leader reaches the detour point). When
the leader is to send out a new path, each follower will be following its current
path, denoted by currentPathi which also consists of n segments and n+ 1
way points. Given this, a set of lines can connect each way point on the
current path with the corresponding way point on the desired path. We
define these lines as Li[0] to Li[n] such that for 0 ≤ p ≤ n, Li[p].startPoint =
currentPathi[p] and Li[p].endPoint = desiredPathi[p].
With these definitions, in order to generate the the kth way point on the
mth intermediate path for follower i, called interPathi[m][k], we take the
following incremental approach: interPathi[m+1][k] = Li[k].start+weight∗
(Li[k].end−Li[k].start) where weight ∈ [0, 1] is the size of incremental step.
By making the weight closer to 0, we can make the intermediate path is closer
to the original path. For maintenance of the formation, we could start with
a lower weight value to make sure the formation is not affected too severely
if some of the vehicles receive the new path and some do not.
Once interPathi[m+ 1] is calculated, we compute reachi[m], which is the
reach set for follower i upon receiving the path update. The reach set, assum-
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ing a controller which moves between way points exactly, is defined as the
area between the current follower path and the potential new path (which
includes all the transitions from the old paths to the new paths), bloated
by the size of the vehicle. If ∀i, j ∈ [0, n] and i 6= j: Reachi[m + 1] does
not intersect Reachj[m], then interPathi[m + 1] can be sent to follower i
as the new path. Otherwise we use a smaller incremental substep by taking
weight := 0.9 ∗ weight and interPathi[m + 1] is recalculated. This itera-
tive recalculation will happen until an interPathi[m+ 1] with a compatible
Reachi[m + 1] is found, or a maximum number of trials is reached which
indicates a chain of compatible actions could not be found.
TheReachi[m+1] sets that are computed after calculations of interPathi[m+
1] are only valid if all the followers have already received interPathi[m]. This
is why the leader will only send interPathi[m+1] to the followers if a progress
update message for interPathi[m] has already been received from each ve-
hicle. If this is not true, the leader will not generate any new paths and
will keep retransmitting the current paths until a progress update is received
from all vehicles.
3.4.3 Implementation and Measurements
We have implemented the described algorithm on the mobile robot simulator
for the StarL platform [34]. StarL is a Java-based programming library for
developing mobile robotics applications to control Roomba robots commu-
nicating over WiFi. It includes a simulator that runs identical robot logic
code, but with simulated dynamics and network delays and drops. A video
of the execution on the simulator is available online [35].
We performed measurements on the implemented platform in order to
better understand the overhead incurred by the Runtime Command Monitor,
and the expected convergence time when using the chained compatible action
approach. In our setup, we simulate a flock of vehicles with a straight initial
path ending in a final way point. Initial formation of the flock is shown in the
Figure 3.7 where distance of each vehicle from its neighbor is 500 units, and
the radius of each vehicle is 165 units. Measurements shown in the tables
are the averages from five executions.
In the first experiment we measure the effect of the distance between the
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Figure 3.7: Initially the vehicles move in parallel straight lines (black). The
red circle is the entered detour point, and the orange line is the desired final
path for the leader vehicle.
new detour point and the initial straight path of system on the convergence
time and network overhead assuming no packetloss, as well as the overhead
of the check in the Runtime Command Monitor. Since a detour point fur-
ther away requires a longer compatible action chain, more time is needed
before the final paths are received by all the followers. This is confirmed in
Table 3.1, where, as the distance of the detour point from the initial path
increases, the number of messages sent and convergence time also increase.
The overhead in terms of number of messages is fairly small, and there is a
linear trend between the detour point deviation from the original path and
the convergence time, which is expected since the length of the compatible
action chains will follow a linear trend.
The overhead of the Runtime Command Monitor is related to the Intersec-
tion Checks column. During execution, paths are checked to be compatible
by, for each vehicle, creating quadrilaterals from pairs of waypoints on the
current path and the new path that have equal times. These quadrilater-
als capture the reachable set of the vehicle transitioning from the current
path to the new path. The distance between these quadrilaterals and those
of neighboring vehicles is computed, and made sure to be larger than the
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Detour Point Convergence ms Msgs Sent Intersection Checks
(1000, 6000) 1942 21 10368
(3000, 6000) 4294 39 15488
(6000, 6000) 7464 60 22472
(7000, 6000) 9834 72 28800
Table 3.1: As the detour point distance increases from the initial path,
compatible action chains contain more steps, which leads to both longer
convergence time and more messages being exchanged. Here, an
packetloss-free network was evaluated with three vehicles.
Packetloss Rate Convergence ms Messages Sent
0% 4850 45.0
20% 7312 57.6
40% 13000 94.2
60% 26818 176.8
Table 3.2: As packetloss increases, both convergence time and total number
of message sent increases.
vehicle diameter. The Intersection Checks column records the number of
these checks, each on a pair of quadrilaterals. This number of checks is done
whenever a new intermediate path is sent to all the vehicles.
Network quality is another parameter that affects performance of the over-
all system. In this experiment we have measured the effect of network quality
on convergence time and the number of messages that need to be sent by
leader to each follower until all the vehicles safely converge to the desired
path.
In this experiment, the flock consists of three vehicles (1 leader, 2 followers)
moving on the straight oﬄine path and a detour point is entered in (5000,
15000). Measurements are shown in Table 3.2. Since, in addition to command
messages, acknowledgment messages are also being dropped, when packetloss
rate is α, the probability of both a message and its acknowledgment being
delivered is (1 − α)(1 − α) which complies with the quadratic trend seen in
the table.
In the last experiment we aim to evaluate the scalability of our approach as
we increase the number of vehicles. For this purpose, we have performed the
experiment with different numbers of vehicles and the results are presented
in Table 3.3. Here, the detour point again was (5000, 15000).
Under ideal communication where packets are not dropped, we notice no
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Vehicles Conv (ms) Msgs Sent Conv (30%) Msgs (30%)
3 4853.3 45 9023.3 69.3
4 4853.3 60 11808.3 105.0
6 4876.0 90 12968.0 159.0
8 4900.0 120 15036.0 228.6
Table 3.3: Under ideal communication (0% packetloss, left), the number of
vehicles does not affect convergence time. However, with packetloss (30%
packetloss, right), more robots leads to a larger convergence time as the
algorithm needs to wait for packets to be retransmitted before continuing.
change in convergence time when the number of vehicles increases, and the
number of messages sent scales linearly. This is because, when no messages
are dropped, all communication is done in parallel so there is no delay expe-
rienced.
In the case where there is 30% packetloss, however, we do see an effect as
we increase the number of vehicles. This is roughly because, with a fixed
chance to miss a packet and a larger number of packets to send, there is a
higher chance that one of the followers will miss the packet or the leader
will miss the acknowledgment. When this occurs, the entire algorithm is
stalled waiting until the message is resent and arrives successfully. This
demonstrates one of the weaknesses of the current approach, namely that
if any of the agents fails to communicate, the algorithm must wait until
communication is reestablished. As future work we may investigate more
robust approaches which can better handle the failure of an agent.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described an approach to increase resilience in a
cyber-physical system from errors in the high-level control logic. Our ap-
proach, monitoring run-time commands in order to maintain a safety in-
variant, is general and powerful, but comes at the cost of performing part
of the checking at run time. We have proven a theorem which states the
exact condition that needs to be checked, in order to design the Runtime
Command Monitor. Furthermore, we have used the notion of chains of pair-
wise compatible actions to provide time-insensitive progress guarantees un-
der normal network conditions where messages eventually arrive at their
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destination (which we have shown can be extended to provide time-aware
guarantees given stronger requirements). The challenge with this approach
is the application-specific task of creating a finite chain of actions, which
take the system from its current state to the goal state. Both of these tech-
niques were implemented in coordinated vehicle flocking case study, and the
run-time overhead of our approach was shown to be tractable.
As future work, we may investigate extending the progress mechanism
from pair-wise compatible action chains to N-way compatible action chains,
which N consecutive actions of a chain can be sent out without requiring
the supervisory controller to wait for a progress confirmation message. The
challenge with this direction is that N-way compatible action chains may
lead to more run-time overhead, and such an approach would need to be
justified by an application which requires the extra flexibility. Additionally,
we could consider more complicated notions of safety rather than invariants,
for example temporal logic properties defined using LTL or CTL. Finally,
we would like to relax the architectural requirement of a central coordinator,
and instead allow distributed agents to send commands to one another as
needed, while still maintaining safety and a notion of progress.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we presented two sets of solutions in an attempt to solve
the problem of maintaining safety while having an unreliable communication
layer in CPS. However, each approach has taken a different direction to
address this issue.
In the first solution, the communication channel is replaced by the data
flow extracted from alternative physical sources. While this solution is not
limited to any architecture (centralized or decentralized) and does not limit
system progress, applying this solution to a CPS, requires expertise and
familiarity with the physical aspects of the system.
In the second solution, global safety of the system was considered regardless
of the physical model and behavior. in this approach we focused on defining
a communication and control protocol for the system to create a balance
between progress and safety. This solution is only applicable to distributed
CPS with central coordinator.
Safety of distributed CPS is an ongoing topic for our research. Lots of
challenges remains in this area that need to be addressed. Verification in
real-time for the systems that do not have an accurate physical model is
one of the interesting directions. Traditional verification solutions have a
very high complexity and checking an invariant even for relatively simple
systems, can take lots of computation power. Reducing this time or finding
alternative solutions needs more study. Another direction that needs further
investigation, is decentralized systems. Maintaining global safety in the CPS
where there is no central leader, can pose lots of challenges. However, lots of
real-world CPS are of this type.
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